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Samuel Asarnow
I describe and motivate Rational Internalism, a principle concerning the relation-
ship between motivating reasons (which explain actions) and normative reasons
(which justify actions). I use this principle to construct a novel argument against
Objectivist theories of normative reasons, which hold that facts about normative
reasons can be analyzed in terms of an independently specified class of norma-
tive or evaluative facts. I then argue for an alternative theory of normative reasons,
the Reasoning View, which is consistent with both Rational Internalism and one
standard motivation for Objectivism.
The idea of a reason for action has two homes in philosophy. One is
in the context of action explanation. It is characteristic of action that
when someone acts, she can explain her action in a distinctive way. She
can give her reasons, explaining her action by explaining why it made
sense to her. Mere bodily movements such as twitches and trips cannot
be explained in this way. Much contemporary action theory takes this to
be the signal trait of actions: all action is action for a reason. The reasons
we appeal to in explaining our actions are typically called motivating
reasons.1
We also appeal to reasons to justify our actions. Prospectively, we
appeal to reasons when we are deciding what to do. Reasons are the “pros
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1. For classic statements of this idea see, e.g., G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); and the essays in Donald Davidson, Essays on
Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Even those who reject the identity
claim typically hold that acting for a reason is a central case of intentional action, as in, e.g., Ro-
salind Hursthouse, “Arational Actions,” Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 57–68; Joseph Raz,
“Agency, Reason, and the Good,” in Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
22–45, and “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative,” in New Essays on the Explanation of Action,
ed. Constantine Sandis (New York: Macmillan, 2009), 184–202. Motivating reasons are some-
times called explanatory reasons.
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and cons” that count in favor of and against possible actions, which justify
us in pursuing some options but not others. Retrospectively, we appeal to
reasons to justify our past actions to ourselves and others. We explain why
there were good reasons to do what we did. The reasons that justify or
count in favor of our actions, either prospectively or retrospectively, have
typically been called normative reasons for action.
What is the relationship between the different kinds of reasons that
we appeal to in these different contexts? Are motivating reasons and
normative reasons related by name alone, or is there some deep con-
nection between these explanatory and justificatory appeals? How is a
bodily movement’s status as an intentional action related to its status as
justified or not?2
This set of questions about the explanation and justification of ac-
tion interacts with one strand of the well-known debate concerning the
internalism requirement on normative reasons. The internalism require-
ment states, roughly, that normative reasons must be able to function as
motivating reasons.3 When a normative reason justifies you in acting in a
certain way, it must be possible for you to act that way for that reason. This
requirement has led some philosophers to a kind of Subjectivism about
normative reasons: they hold that the “source” of all normative reasons lies
in an agent’s desires or motivations.4 For philosophers who accept the
Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM) and thus understand motivating
reasons in part in terms of an agent’s desires, Subjectivism promises a uni-
fied explanation of both kinds of reasons.
The internalism requirement has been controversial, as it appears
to constrain which actions we have normative reasons to perform. Ber-
nard Williams, for example, thought that the internalism requirement
ruled out the possibility of sources of value that are objective in the sense
of providing normative reasons to all agents, including agents who are
not moved by them.5 A number of philosophers have taken on the
2. This way of setting up the problem may be contentious: some philosophers will resist
the idea that motivating reasons and normative reasons are two different things, whose rela-
tionship we might seek to understand. For doubts along these lines, see Jonathan Dancy,
Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 1.
3. The literature on this issue is vast. Three influential defenses of internalism are
Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” inMoral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), 101–13; Christine M. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Rea-
son,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5–25; Michael Smith, “Internal Reasons,” in Ethics and
the A Priori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 17–42.
4. On this talk of “sources,” see, e.g., Ruth Chang, “Grounding Practical Normativity:
Going Hybrid,” Philosophical Studies 164 (2013): 163–87.
5. See Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” “Ought and Moral Obligation,” in
Moral Luck, 114–23, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense of Hu-
manity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35–45, and “Some Further Notes on
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ambitious project of trying to reconcile the internalism requirement,
and even Subjectivism, with the existence of such objective values.6 Some
others, skeptical of that possibility, have been led to reject the internal-
ism requirement. Their confidence in the existence of such objective val-
ues has been greater than their confidence that there is this kind of deep
connection between motivating reasons and normative reasons.7
In the first two sections of this article, I argue that this familiar
dialectic is not all there is to the question of how we should understand
the internalism requirement and the relationship between motivating
reasons and normative reasons. In Section I, I describe the internalism
requirement in its intuitive, schematic form, as well as its standard inter-
pretation, which I call Dispositional Internalism. I think the schematic ver-
sion of the internalism requirement is highly plausible, but I reject Dispo-
sitional Internalism. In Section II, I draw on a neglected part of the theory
of action to develop a novel interpretation of the internalism requirement,
which I call Rational Internalism. I argue that we should understand the
internalism requirement as relating what it is for a normative reason to
count in favor of an action and what it is for a motivating reason to make
sense of an action, or to rationalize it (in something like Donald David-
6. Examples include Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”; Smith, “Internal
Reasons”; Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007);
Julia Markovits, Moral Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Kieran Setiya, Rea-
sons without Rationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
7. Some of these philosophers, including Warren Quinn, have rejected Subjectiv-
ism and instead embraced Objectivist theories of reasons, which analyze facts about nor-
mative reasons in terms of some independently specified class of normative or evaluative
facts. Objectivist views are defended in, e.g., Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good”; Warren
Quinn, “Putting Rationality in Its Place,” in Morality and Action, ed. Philippa Foot (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 228–55; John Broome, Rationality through Rea-
soning (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); John Brunero, “Reasons as Explanations,” Philo-
sophical Studies 165 (2013): 805–24; Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star, “Reasons as Evidence,”
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4 (2009): 215–42; Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006). Other philosophers, including Derek Parfit and T. M. Scan-
lon, have rejected Subjectivism and instead embraced Primitivist views, according to which
facts about normative reasons are unanalyzable. For examples of Primitivism, see, e.g., Jona-
than Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); T. M. Scanlon,
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), appendix, and
Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Derek Parfit, On What
Matters, vol. 1, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 3; John
Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). For Parfit’s brief
discussion of motivating reasons, see On What Matters, 1:37, 454–55. Note also that not all
Objectivists and Primitivists are motivated specifically by the rejection of Subjectivism or the
internalism requirement.
Internal and External Reasons,” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. Elijah Millgram (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 91–97.
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son’s original sense of that term).8 Rational Internalism is consistent with
the existence of objective values, and I argue that even those who object
to the standard interpretation of the internalism requirement on that
ground should accept Rational Internalism.
Rational Internalism does have consequences for the normative
reasons debate, however. In Section III, I argue that it is desirable to ex-
tend our theory of normative reasons to offer a theory of rationalization
that would allow us to explain why Rational Internalism is true. I then ar-
gue that there is no straightforward and attractive way for standard forms
of Objectivism about normative reasons to be extended in this way. I con-
sider two ways Objectivists might go about this, by adopting moral psycho-
logical theses such as the so-called guise of the good thesis or perceptual-
ism about desire. I argue that both strategies face serious challenges.
This failure of Objectivism is a serious drawback of the theory, as
there is a different theory of normative reasons that can accommodate
the existence of objective values and also offer an explanation of why Ra-
tional Internalism is true. In Section IV, I briefly describe that theory,
which is called the Reasoning View. The Reasoning View about normative
reasons has recently been defended by philosophers such as Kieran Setiya
and Jonathan Way and has roots in the theories of reasons of Williams,
Paul Grice, and Gilbert Harman.9 The Reasoning View locates facts about
normative reasons in facts about patterns of sound reasoning or sound
deliberation—deliberationwhich can take into account bothbeliefs about
objective values in the world and our desires and intentions. I argue that
those attracted to Objectivism should find the Reasoning View an ap-
pealing option, as it satisfies a central motivation for that view while also
allowing us to tell a plausible story about the relation between normative
reasons and motivating reasons.
8. On the relevant notion of rationalization, see, e.g., Donald Davidson, “Intending”
and “Actions, Reasons, andCauses,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1980), 83–102, 3–20; David Israel, John Perry, and Syun Tutiya, “Executions, Motiva-
tions, and Accomplishments,” Philosophical Review 102 (1993): 515–40; Lilian O’Brien, “Da-
vidson on Justification and Rationalization,” Daimon: Revista de Filosofia 37 (2006): 171–77.
9. See Gilbert Harman, Change in View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1986), app. C; H. P. Grice, Aspects of Reason, ed. Richard Warner (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), pt. 1; Setiya, Reasons without Rationalism, and “What Is a Reason to
Act?” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014): 221–35; Jonathan Way, “Reasons as Premises of Good
Reasoning,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). Compare also Matthew Silverstein,
“Reducing Reasons,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (2016). At one point, a version
of the Reasoning View was also defended by Joseph Raz, as in Practical Reason and Norms
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), and “Introduction,” in Practical Reasoning, ed. Jo-
seph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1–17. Similar ideas can also be found in
Simon Blackburn, “The Majesty of Reason,” in Practical Tortoise Raising (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 248–50; Antti Kauppinen, “Favoring,” Philosophical Studies 172 (2015):
1953–71.
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I. THE INTERNALISM REQUIREMENT AND
DISPOSITIONAL INTERNALISM
The Internalism Requirement concerns the relationship between moti-
vating reasons and normative reasons. It is a commonplace to observe
that one and the same considerationmight both justify an agent in acting
and explain why she acted as she did. In Davidson’s well-known example,
that you stepped on my toes might both explain and justify my indignant
act.10 The Internalism Requirement is a strengthening of this idea. Ac-
cording to the Internalism Requirement, not only do normative reasons
sometimes explain our actions, but all normative reasons are apt to do so.
As Korsgaard influentially put it, “It seems to be a requirement on [nor-
mative] practical reasons, that they be capable of motivating us.”11
This connection between normative reasons and motivating rea-
sons functions as a constraint on normative reasons: for a fact to be a
normative reason for someone to act, it must be possible, in some sense,
for that person to act for that reason. We can put this precisely, although
schematically, as follows:
Internalism Requirement. If p is a normative reason for A to f,
then it is possible (in some sense) for A to f for the reason that p.
The Internalism Requirement, stated schematically in this way, has sub-
stantial intuitive appeal but little definite content. The force of the prin-
ciple depends on how we interpret the claim that it must be possible for
A to f for the reason that p.12
A single interpretation of this modal clause, which I call Disposi-
tional Internalism, has dominated recent work on normative reasons.
Dispositional Internalism interprets the relevant sense of possibility by
appealing to HTM.13 According to HTM, whenever someone acts, the
causal explanation of her action includes one of her pro-attitudes, that
10. Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 8.
11. Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 11. See also, e.g., Williams, “Inter-
nal and External Reasons,” and “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame.”
12. The Internalism Requirement should not be confused with the thesis often called
“judgment internalism,” according to which normative judgment is a mental state type that
is systematically associated with motivation. See, e.g., Sigru´n Svavarsdo´ttir, “Moral Cogni-
tivism and Motivation,” Philosophical Review 108 (1999): 161–219.
13. Interpreting the Internalism Requirement in terms of HTM is an approach closely
associated with the work of Bernard Williams, as in “Internal and External Reasons,”
“Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” “Ought and Moral Obligation,” and “Some
Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons.” This interpretation can also be found in,
e.g., Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions; Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell,
1994), and “Internal Reasons”; Alan Goldman, Reasons from Within (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
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is, a mental state whose functional role is motivational (as opposed to
one whose role is representational).14
HTM leads naturally to an interpretation of the Internalism
Requirement. It implies that a necessary condition on acting in a certain
way is having an appropriate pro-attitude. When an agent has a pro-
attitude disposing her toward an action, there is a straightforward sense
in which it is thus possible for her to perform that action: she satisfies a
necessary condition. The Internalism Requirement can then be fleshed
out in terms of this kind of possibility. Whenever there is a normative
reason for an agent to f, she has a pro-attitude toward f-ing. Proponents
of the Internalism Requirement have generally allowed for a certain
amount of idealization. They consider it possible in the relevant sense
for an agent to f when she would have a pro-attitude toward f-ing were
she fully informed, deliberating clearly, or idealized in some other way. I
call the resulting view Dispositional Internalism, as it appeals to the
dispositional idea of a pro-attitude:15
Dispositional Internalism. There is a normative reason for A to
f only if A has a pro-attitude toward f-ing (or would have one if
moderately idealized).16
Proponents of Dispositional Internalism have often been led to Subjec-
tivism about normative reasons.17 Subjectivism is the biconditional version
14. On HTM, see, e.g., Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”; Smith, The Moral
Problem; Neil Sinhababu, “The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended,”
Philosophical Review 118 (2009): 465–500. The version of HTM at issue here is what Sinha-
babu calls the Desire-Belief Theory of Action.
15. Those who prefer a nondispositional account of what makes a mental state a pro-
attitude may call the principle Pro-Attitude Internalism.
16. Note that Dispositional Internalism drops the connection between a particular
fact’s status as a normative reason and a particular mental state’s being a motivating reason
that the Internalism Requirement demanded. For discussion of how to modify Disposi-
tional Internalism to capture that connection see Kieran Setiya, “Introduction: Internal
Reasons,” in Internal Reasons: Contemporary Readings, ed. Kieran Setiya and Hille Paakku-
nainen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 4–5; Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 29ff.
versity Press, 2009); David Sobel, “Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action,” Ethics 111
(2001): 461–92; Julia Markovits, “Why Be an Internalist about Reasons?” Oxford Studies in
Metaethics 6 (2010): 255–79. For an interpretation of Williams that downplays the role of
Dispositional Internalism in his thought, see Stephen Finlay, “The Obscurity of Internal
Reasons,” Philosophers’ Imprint 9 (2009): 1–22.
17. Williams officially endorsed only Dispositional Internalism, but he suggested that
he believed Subjectivism was true as well. See, e.g., Williams, “Internal Reasons and the
Obscurity of Blame,” 35–36. Versions of Subjectivism motivated by internalism can be found
in Smith, “Internal Reasons”; and Markovits, Moral Reason; as well as, arguably, Christine
M. Korsgaard,The Sources of Normativity, ed.OnoraO’Neill (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1996), and “Skepticism about Practical Reason”; Sharon Street, “Constructivism about
Reasons,”Oxford Studies inMetaethics 3 (2008): 207–45. Not all proponents of Subjectivism are
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of Dispositional Internalism, offered as an analysis (in some sense) of facts
about normative reasons:
Subjectivism. There is a normative reason for A to f if and only if
A has a pro-attitude toward f-ing (or would have one if moderately
idealized).
Crucially, Subjectivism, together with HTM, provides what I will call a
unified explanation of the Internalism Requirement. According to this
pair of views, both normative reasons and motivating reasons can be un-
derstood, fundamentally, in terms of an agent’s pro-attitudes. This ex-
plains why the Internalism Requirement is true. Normative reasons are apt
to serve as motivating reasons because the two kinds of reasons are both
analyzable in terms of pro-attitudes.
Dispositional Internalism and Subjectivism both face serious prob-
lems.18 It is widely thought that some sources of value (such as morality
and prudence) are objective, in the sense that they give normative rea-
sons even to agents who are not moved by them. Even Caligula, who
thought that morality was not normatively important and who desired
to do immoral things, had normative reasons to be moral.19 Since agents
like Caligula lack pro-attitudes toward the actions morality requires of
them, and would continue to lack those attitudes even if moderately ide-
alized, it is hard to see howDispositional Internalism and Subjectivism can
explain how these agents could have those reasons.
Subjectivism faces an additional problem. Subjectivism appears to
entail that agents like Caligula have normative reasons to perform the
immoral actions they desire to perform. After all, Caligula has an appro-
priate pro-attitude and would continue to have it if he were moderately
idealized. Many philosophers find this idea unacceptable. Allan Gibbard
18. My presentation of these problems follows Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, chaps. 5
and 6.
19. The example of Caligula was introduced in Allan Gibbard, “Morality as Consis-
tency in Living: Korsgaard’s Kantian Lectures,” Ethics 110 (1999): 140–64, 145–49, and has
been widely discussed, notably in Sharon Street, “In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference:
Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters,” Philosophical Issues 19
(2009): 273–98. Street defends a Subjectivist-like view against this challenge. Note that in this
article I use the expression “A has a normative reason to f” as shorthand for “there is
a normative reason for A to f.”
explicitly motivated by internalism, and indeed not all versions of Subjectivism are consis-
tent with Dispositional Internalism. Examples of Subjectivism not motivated by internalism
include those found in Goldman, Reasons from Within; Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions; Sobel,
“Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action.” Some philosophers motivated by internalist ideas
accept the Internalism Requirement or Subjectivism as a characterization of a restricted part
of the normative domain, such as facts about well-being. For this view, see, e.g., Peter Railton,
“Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 163–207; Connie S. Rosati, “Internalism and
the Good for a Person,” Ethics 106 (1996): 297–326.
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and other metaethical noncognitivists, for example, have argued that when
an agent claims that there is a normative reason for Caligula to commit
evil, that agent is thereby endorsing Caligula’s action in a distinctive way.20
Those reluctant to endorse cruel or evil acts face pressure to deny that
Caligula genuinely has a normative reason to perform them. Subjectivism
thus appears to overgenerate reasons by giving immoral agents normative
reasons to commit evil acts.
The debate over the Internalism Requirement sometimes appears
to have reached a stalemate. Those moved by the Internalism Require-
ment have typically been led, via Dispositional Internalism, to Subjec-
tivist views that require them to reject the existence of objective values
and the Gibbard-like idea described above.21 They have responded to
the objections to Subjectivism by trying to make plausible the rejection
of the widely held intuitions about values and reasons that these objec-
tions rely on.22 Those unwilling to accept Subjectivism’s normative ver-
dicts concerning Caligula have often been led to Objectivist or Primitivist
theories of normative reasons, which analyze facts about normative rea-
sons in terms of an independent class of normative or evaluative facts or
hold that facts about normative reasons are unanalyzable. Rejecting the
Internalism Requirement, these philosophers often are skeptical of the
20. See, e.g., Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1990), 22, 160ff., “Morality as Consistency in Living,” 145ff., and Thinking How
to Live (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 2003), 188ff. For discussion of this idea, see
Michael E. Bratman, “Intention, PracticalRationality, andSelf-Governance,”Ethics 119 (2009):
414–15.
21. A number of philosophers have attempted to reconcile Subjectivist views with the
existence of objective values, typically by exploiting the idealization referred to by Sub-
jectivism. See, e.g., Korsgaard, “Skepticism about Practical Reason”; Smith, “Internal Rea-
sons”; Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions; Markovits, Moral Reason; Setiya, Reasons without Ratio-
nalism; Smith, The Moral Problem, chap. 5. Challenges for this approach have been widely
discussed; see, e.g., Gibbard, “Morality as Consistency in Living”; David Enoch, “Agency,
Shmagency:WhyNormativityWon’t Come fromWhat Is Constitutive of Action,” Philosophical
Review 115 (2006): 169–98; David Sobel, “Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?”
Analysis 59 (1999): 137–47; G. A. Cohen, “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law,” in Kors-
gaard, The Sources of Normativity, 167–88; Williams, “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of
Blame,” 36–37; DavidEnoch, “Why Idealize?”Ethics 115 (2005): 759–87; S. L.Hurley, “Reason
and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?” Analysis 61 (2001): 151–55; Robert N. Johnson,
“Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy,” Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999): 54–71; Julia
Markovits, “Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition,” in New Waves in Metaethics, ed.
Michael Brady (New York: Macmillan, 2010), 141–65.
22. See, e.g., Williams, “Ought and Moral Obligation,” and “Internal Reasons and the
Obscurity of Blame”; Street, “Constructivism about Reasons,” “In Defense of Future Tues-
day Indifference,” and “Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about
Practical Reason,” in Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, ed. James Lenman and Yonatan
Shemmer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 40–59; Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions,
chap. 5.
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existence of any deep connection between normative reasons and moti-
vating reasons.23
In the following section, I argue that Dispositional Internalism is
not the only way to interpret the intuitive idea that the Internalism Re-
quirement states. I describe an alternate interpretation of the Internal-
ism Requirement which is highly plausible but which does not lead to
the kinds of problems that have plagued Subjectivism.
II. RATIONAL INTERNALISM
Dispositional Internalism interprets the Internalism Requirement’s un-
specified modal clause in terms of a necessary condition on action sup-
plied by HTM. The interpretation of the Internalism Requirement I pre-
fer appeals to a different component of many causal theories of action,
which I follow Davidson in calling the rationalization relation. In this sec-
tion, I introduce the rationalization relation and use it to define and mo-
tivate my preferred interpretation, which I call Rational Internalism.
A. The Rationalization Relation
Standard causal theories of action hold that an agent’s motivating rea-
son is a set of mental states (typically including at least one pro-attitude)
that in part cause the bodily movement that constitutes the agent’s
action. As Davidson famously pointed out, however, a bodily movement
may have many of the agent’s mental states among its causes, only some
of which count as the agent’s reason for acting.24 Consider a waiter who
pours a glass of water. As she prepares to pour, she may form the belief
that the person whose water glass she is filling is a celebrity. This belief
may then play a causal role in the production of the bodily movement
that constitutes her action: it may, for example, cause her hand to
tremble as she pours the water. But it may not be true that this belief was
her reason for pouring. It may be that she poured the water not because
the person was a celebrity but because the glass was empty and she
wanted to fill it.
What distinguishes the mental states that merely play a causal role
in producing the bodily movement that is the agent’s action from those
that are part of her motivating reason? According to Davidson, the dif-
ference is that the action makes sense to the waiter in light of the goal
23. See, e.g., Broome, Rationality through Reasoning, 47. Also cf. Parfit, On What Matters,
1:37, 454–55. For Objectivist or Primitivist views that maintain a close connection between
motivating reasons and normative reasons by rejecting the causal theory of action, see
Dancy, Practical Reality; Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good.”
24. In, e.g., Davidson, “Intending,” and “Freedom to Act,” in Essays on Actions and
Events, 63–82.
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that her belief and desire embody (i.e., filling the empty glass) but not in
light of her belief that the person is a celebrity. In Davidson’s jargon, the
mental states that are the agent’s motivating reason are the mental states
that rationalize the action.25 Those mental states enable the waiter to see
the action as a candidate intentional action (although she may not see
them as justifying the action). Within the causal theory of action, ra-
tionalization provides a second necessary condition on motivating rea-
sons: they are mental states that both cause and rationalize action.26
The way I use this idea here, rationalization is a relation that holds
between possible mental states (such as the belief that p) and action types
(paired with agents). A set of possible mental states can stand in the
rationalization relation to A’s f-ing regardless of whether A ever fs (and
regardless of whether A has those mental states).27 By contrast, I use the
term “motivating reason” here to refer to the particular mental states of
A that both rationalized and (nondeviantly) caused A’s action in a par-
ticular case.28
B. Rational Internalism
I introduce Rational Internalism by analogy with the argument for Dis-
positional Internalism discussed above. Proponents of Dispositional In-
ternalism appeal to a necessary condition on an agent’s f-ing (supplied
by HTM) in order to make more specific the modal clause in the sche-
matic Internalism Requirement. They claim it is possible for an agent to
f (in the relevant sense) just in case she meets an important necessary
condition on f-ing, namely, that she has a pro-attitude toward f-ing.
25. In, e.g., Davidson, “Intending,” and “Freedom to Act.” Compare also Israel, Perry,
and Tutiya, “Executions, Motivations, and Accomplishments”; John Gibbons, “Things That
Make Things Reasonable,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2010): 335–61;
O’Brien, “Davidson on Justification and Rationalization.” (O’Brien is critical of Davidson’s
theory of rationalization.) Note also that, for Davidson, the mental states that rationalize
the action stand in a distinctive relationship to the descriptions under which the action is
intentional.
26. There may be a third necessary condition, as well, specifying that the causation be
“nondeviant.” See, e.g., Davidson, “Freedom to Act,” 79–80; Kieran Setiya, “Reasons and
Causes,” European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2011): 129–57.
27. Strictly speaking, I hold that the rationalization relation takes two relata: (a) a set
of triples, each relating an agent, a mental state type, and a content, and (b) a pair of an
agent and an action type. For example, the set {A’s belief that p, A’s desire that q } might
rationalize A’s f-ing. I explain my preferred theory of rationalization in Sec. IV below. On
my view, facts about rationalization are normative facts, but the causal theory per se does
not require that commitment (see, e.g., Timothy Schroeder, “Practical Rationality Is a Prob-
lem in the Philosophy of Mind,” Philosophical Issues 20 [2010]: 394–409).
28. Here I follow Davidson’s usage in Davidson, “Intending.” In earlier papers, Da-
vidson sometimes uses “rationalization” in a way that implies causation. See Davidson, “Ac-
tions, Reasons, and Causes,” 3.
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The idea of rationalization generates a different necessary condi-
tion on an agent’s f-ing and thus a different interpretation of the rele-
vant notion of possibility. According to the causal theory, when an agent
fs for the reason that p, her action is (in part) caused by her belief that
p, and that belief (perhaps along with other mental states of hers) ra-
tionalizes her action. It is thus a necessary condition on an agent f-ing
for the reason that p that the belief that p stands in the rationalization
relation to A’s f-ing. If the belief that p does not stand in the rationali-
zation relation to A’s f-ing—that is, if someone who believed p could
not see f-ing as a candidate intentional action—then no one could f for
the reason that p.
If we interpret the Internalism Requirement in terms of this notion
of possibility, the result is a provisional version of Rational Internalism:
Rational Internalism (Provisional). If a set of facts, R, is a nor-
mative reason for A to f, and P is a set of beliefs with those facts
as their contents, then P stands in the rationalization relation to A’s
f-ing.
Loosely put, Rational Internalism says that the relation of counting in
favor is contained within the relation of rationalizing. If p counts in favor
of A’s f-ing, then the belief that p rationalizes A’s f-ing.
Rational Internalism(Provisional) faces an immediateproblem.Many
philosophers (even those who are not Subjectivists) accept that sometimes
the fact that an agent has a certain desire or intention is a normative reason
for her to act.29 Rational Internalism (Provisional) has an awkward conse-
quence if this is true: the fact that A intends to f is a reason for her to f
only if the belief that she intends to f stands in the rationalization relation
to f-ing. Many philosophers will find it natural to say that in such a case it
should be sufficient (and perhaps it is necessary) for A’s intention to f
itself to rationalize A’s f-ing, rather than for A’s f-ing to be rationalized by
the belief that A intends to f.
To solve this problem, I propose that we appeal to a second idea
familiar from the causal theory of action. Most versions of the causal the-
ory of action hold that, while motivating reasons (strictly speaking) are
mental states, we can nonetheless often explain actions by appealing to
worldly facts. In Davidson’s example above, we can explain my indignant
act by citing a worldly fact (the fact that you stepped on my toes) rather
than one of mymental states (my belief that you stepped onmy toes). It is
29. Although this is controversial; for discussion, see, e.g., Scanlon, What We Owe to
Each Other, chap. 1; David Sobel, “Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste,”
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (2005): 437–57; Ruth Chang, “Commitments, Reasons,
and the Will,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8 (2013): 74–113.
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a general problem for causal theories of action to say when we can ex-
plain agents’ actions by citing facts instead of citing their mental states.
Any causal theory of action must explain what kind of relationship needs
to hold between a fact, F, and a mental state, M, such that, when M was
your reason for action, F counts as your reason for action as well.30
I do not have a full theory of this relationship, but I can state two
necessary conditions that I think are relatively uncontroversial. (These
conditions may well be jointly sufficient, and I suspect they are, but I
cannot defend that idea here.) The first is an explanatory condition. Mi-
chael Smith has argued, and I agree, that for any fact to count as an ex-
planation of an agent’s action, qua action, the fact must in part explain
the fact that the agent has (at least one of) themental states that constitute
her motivating reason.31 The fact that an agent is grieving, for example,
may explain her action of tearing at her clothes because it explains (in
part) why she desires to tear at her clothes, and that desire is part of the
causal explanation of her action. The same is true of explanations in terms
of an agent’s reasons, which form a subset of the explanations just men-
tioned. In order for a fact to count as the agent’s reason for action, it must
in part explain the fact that the agent has one of the mental states that is
part of her motivating reason.
This explanatory necessary condition must be supplemented with
at least one further necessary condition. Many facts that in part explain
why the agent has the mental states that constitute her motivating reason
cannot themselves be cited as her reasons for action. For example, facts
about the functioning of an agent’s sensory organs will in part explain
why she has most of her true beliefs. However, those facts are not, in gen-
eral, citable as her reasons for action every time those beliefs are part of
her motivating reasons. By contrast, typically the facts that are the con-
tents of the agent’s (true) beliefs can be cited as the agent’s reasons (as
long as those factsmeet the explanatory necessary condition). A theory of
when facts can be cited as reasons-explanations of actions must thus in-
clude a further necessary condition which can distinguish these two kinds
of cases.
I do not know how to state the second necessary condition precisely.
What I can do is give the necessary condition a name, provide two par-
adigm cases that satisfy it, and provide a guiding conjecture. In my ter-
30. This problem has received little attention, although I think it is one of the most
important outstanding challenges for the causal theory of action. Some helpful remarks
can be found in Michael Smith, “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action,” in Ethics and the
A Priori, 155–77; Maria Alvarez, Kinds of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
chap. 6. A detailed study of related problems is Dancy, Practical Reality. See also James
Pryor, “Reasons and That-Clauses,” Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 217–44.
31. See, e.g., Smith, “Possibility of Philosophy of Action,” 158–60. It may be that this
explanatory requirement will require a nondeviance condition.
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minology, this second necessary condition is that the mental state and
the fact must be appropriately related. The two paradigm cases of the ap-
propriate relation hold between (a) the fact that p and an agent’s belief
that p and (b) the fact that the agent has mental state M and the mental
state M itself. In general, when an agent’s belief that p is part of her
motivating reason, and the fact that p in part explains the fact that she
has that belief, p can be cited as her reason. The same goes for the fact
that an agent has a mental state M. When M is part of an agent’s moti-
vating reason, the fact that she is in M (trivially) explains the fact that
she is in M (by constituting it), and so can also be cited as her reason for
acting.
My conjecture is that the appropriate relation holds between a men-
tal state and a proposition (or a possible fact) when being in that mental
state is, in general, a way of recognizing or responding to that fact. By that
I mean that being in that mental state will ceteris paribus lead you to be
guided by that fact in your thought and action. Believing p is a way of
recognizing or responding to p, and desiring that p is (trivially) a way of
recognizing that you desire that p, since someone who believes that p is
guided by p in her thought and action, and someone who desires that p
is guided by that desire in her thought and action.32 According to this
conjecture, it is a necessary condition on a fact, F, explaining an agent’s
action that one of the mental states that constitute the agent’s motivating
reason is a mental state that is, in some sense, a way of recognizing that F
obtains.
Although I have not offered a full theory of this relation, I think we
have a sufficient grasp of it to use it to solve the problem facing the
provisional version of Rational Internalism. Instead of appealing to a
rationalization relation holding between beliefs about R and the agent’s
action, the rationalization relation must hold between mental states ap-
propriately related to R and the agent’s action. If you had those mental
states, you would be in a position to see f-ing as a candidate intentional
action. The final Rational Internalism principle can thus be formulated as
follows:
Rational Internalism. If a set of facts, R, is a normative reason
for A to f, and P is a set of mental states appropriately related to
the elements of R, then P stands in the rationalization relation to
A’s f-ing.
32. This does not require that desires are “luminous” in the sense of Timothy Wil-
liamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 4. Desires
can guide our thought and action directly, without the mediation of self-knowledge. For an
argument that such guidance can in fact be a source of self-knowledge of desire, see Krista
Lawlor, “KnowingWhatOneWants,” Philosophy andPhenomenological Research 79 (2009): 47–75.
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Rational Internalism captures cases in which a worldly fact is a normative
reason for you to act as well as cases in which the fact that you have a
certain desire or intention is a normative reason for you to act.
While both are interpretations of the Internalism Requirement,
Rational Internalism and Dispositional Internalism are logically inde-
pendent. Rational Internalism does not entail Dispositional Internalism.
Rational Internalism can be satisfied even if some agents (and their
moderately idealized counterparts) lack any mental states appropriately
related to the normative reasons for them to act and thus fail to satisfy
Dispositional Internalism.33 Dispositional Internalism does not entail
Rational Internalism. According to Dispositional Internalism, whenever
p is a normative reason for you to f, then under the specified conditions
you would have a pro-attitude toward f-ing. A pro-attitude is simply a
mental state with a broadly desire-like dispositional profile, however, and
not all states that dispose you to f rationalize your f-ing. (Recognition of
that fact is part of what led Davidson to introduce the idea of rational-
ization in the first place.)
C. Why Accept Rational Internalism?
I think a wide range of philosophers should be attracted to Rational In-
ternalism. First, Rational Internalism is an appealing option for philoso-
phers who find the Internalism Requirement in its schematic form appeal-
ing but who accept the existence of objective values. Rational Internalism
allows p to be a normative reason for you to f regardless of your actual (or
idealized) motivational psychology. Rational Internalism thus allows for
agents like Caligula to have reasons to respect the humanity of others.
Moreover, since Rational Internalism does not provide sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of a normative reason for you to f, it does not en-
tail that there is a normative reason for Caligula to torture his victims.
Philosophers who accept Dispositional Internalism also have strong
reasons to accept Rational Internalism. Indeed, I suspect most propo-
nents of Dispositional Internalism have tacitly assumed a version of Ra-
tional Internalism alongside it.34 Consider a theory of reasons according
to which Dispositional Internalism was true but Rational Internalism was
false. According to that theory, whenever p is a reason for A to f, A has a
pro-attitude toward f-ing. This theory does not guarantee, however, that
33. Indeed, Rational Internalism allows there to be a normative reason for you to f
even if the only way for you to come to adopt mental states appropriately related to R would
be via what John McDowell has called “something like conversion.” See John McDowell,
“Might There Be External Reasons?” inWorld, Mind, and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross
Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 68–85, 74; as well as Bernard
Williams, “Replies,” in Altham and Harrison, World, Mind, and Ethics, 185–224.
34. This may be because of an assumption that (pace Davidson) all pro-attitudes to-
ward an action rationalize it.
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A’s pro-attitude toward f-ing is one that rationalizes f-ing. It might be that
(for example) A has a nervous habit that disposes her toward f-ing, but
in light of which f-ing does not seem like an intelligible thing to do. Dis-
positional Internalism becomes much more appealing once one also as-
sumes Rational Internalism: according to this double theory, p is a reason
for A to f only if, if A believed that p, A would have a pro-attitude toward
f-ing, and that pro-attitude (perhaps along with some of A’s beliefs) ra-
tionalizes her f-ing.
Philosophers not antecedently moved by the Internalism Require-
ment also have strong reasons to accept Rational Internalism as a partial
account of the relationship between motivating reasons and normative
reasons. A theory of normative reasons should explain how these two
different types of reasons for action are related or explain why they are
not related. Rational Internalism offers part of an appealing answer to
that explanatory demand. According to Rational Internalism, motivat-
ing reasons and normative reasons are related because there is an im-
portant relationship between what it is for mental states to rationalize an
action (when they serve as a motivating reason) and what it is for facts
to count in favor of an action (when they serve as a normative reason).
Loosely put, that relationship is one of containment: the rationalization
relation contains the normative reason relation, in the sense that when a
fact is a normative reason for an action, the recognition of that fact is a
mental state that rationalizes the action.
To see why even those philosophers not antecedently motivated by
the Internalism Requirement should find Rational Internalism appeal-
ing, consider the consequences of a theory that rejects it. According to
Rational Internalism, having mental states that are appropriately related
to a normative reason is sufficient for having mental states that ratio-
nalize acting in the relevant way. Mental states rationalize an action when
someone who has those mental states is in a position to see the point of
acting in that way—when the action is intelligible to her as something
she might do intentionally. The denial of Rational Internalism thus en-
tails that someone might have mental states appropriately related to
normative reasons for her to f and yet be unable to see the point in act-
ing that way at all, that is, unable to see that action as a candidate inten-
tional action.35 Suppose that in some cases an agent’s intention to f is a
reason to f, or the fact that f-ing would be valuable is a reason for the
agent to f. In such cases, a theory that denies Rational Internalism might
hold that the agent could intend to f, or judge that f-ing would be valu-
35. Recall that having mental states that rationalize f-ing does not entail that you
judge, or are in a position to judge, that you have a normative reason to f. An agent may see
an action as a candidate intentional action even while denying that she has any reason to
perform it, as in some cases of temptation.
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able, but fail to be in a position to see f-ing as even a candidate action she
might perform intentionally. It strikes me as highly implausible that this
is possible.
Moreover, the obvious packages of commitments that might lead
one to reject Rational Internalism and maintain that such cases are pos-
sible do not seem appealing, and I believe they are not widely held. One
possible set of commitments that entails the rejection of Rational In-
ternalism is the following: (a) the facts that constitute normative rea-
sons are facts about the goodness or badness of actions; (b) judgments
of goodness and badness are ordinary beliefs, not pro-attitudes; and
(c) all sets of mental states that rationalize actions include at least one
pro-attitude. On such a view, an agent might believe that an action would
be good, and thus recognize the normative reason for her to do it, but not
see it as eligible to be an intentional action of hers (since she had no
motivation to do it). It is hard to see the appeal of this package of com-
mitments. I conjecture that most philosophers who would accept both
(a) and (c) reject (b).36 And I conjecture that most philosophers who
accept both (a) and (b) reject (c). They would accept that evaluative
judgments alone can rationalize action.37
I thus think that a wide variety of philosophers will wish to accept
Rational Internalism. Those who already accept Dispositional Internal-
ism will wish to accept Rational Internalism in addition. Those who are
moved by the Internalism Requirement but who reject Dispositional
Internalism on normative grounds can embrace Rational Internalism as
an alternative. And philosophers not motivated by the Internalism Re-
quirement should accept Rational Internalism as a highly plausible part
of an account of the relationship between motivating reasons and nor-
mative reasons.
III. OBJECTIVISM AND RATIONAL INTERNALISM
Because Rational Internalism is consistent with the possibility of objec-
tive values, it promises to render the Internalism Requirement consis-
tent with a wide range of non-Subjectivist theories of normative reasons.
In this section, however, I argue that Rational Internalism in fact presents
a challenge to one prominent family of non-Subjectivist theories: those
that analyze facts about normative reasons in terms of some indepen-
dently specified class of normative or evaluative facts. I call this family of
theories Objectivism.
Recall that Subjectivist theories, paired with HTM, offer a unified
account of normative reasons and motivating reasons, explaining both
36. Plausibly this is the view described in Smith, The Moral Problem.
37. This appears to be the view of Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good.”
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in terms of desire. They thus offer a unified explanation of Dispositional
Internalism. Below I argue that it is difficult to see how Objectivism can
be extended to offer a similar unified explanation of Rational Internal-
ism. In particular, there is no straightforward and attractive way for Ob-
jectivists to develop a suitable theory of the rationalization relation. In the
section that follows, I argue that this is a real problem for Objectivism
because there is a different non-Subjectivist theory, the Reasoning View,
that can straightforwardly offer such a unified explanation of Rational In-
ternalism while allowing for the existence of objective values.
A. Extending Objectivism
Objectivist theories of normative reasons analyze facts about normative
terms of an independently specified class of normative or evaluative facts,
such as facts about goodness and badness, or facts about what agents
ought to do. The objection I describe below applies to Objectivism quite
generally, but I focus on a version of Objectivism derived from those de-
fended by John Broome and John Brunero.38 Versions of Objectivism are
differentiated in terms of what kind of normative or evaluative facts they
employ and in terms of what relation the fact that is the reason stands
in to the normative or evaluative fact. The version I will discuss employs
a set of evaluative facts (as Brunero does) and the notion of explanation
that both Broome and Brunero appeal to:
Objectivism about Normative Reasons. A set of facts, F, is a nor-
mative reason for A to f if and only if F explains the fact that A’s
f-ing would be good.39
For Objectivism about Normative Reasons to provide an explanation of
Rational Internalism, it must offer a theory of rationalization—a theory
of when a set of mental states rationalizes a possible action for an agent,
or “makes sense” of it in the relevant sense. This theory should show
what normative reasons and motivating reasons have in common, such
that normative reasons are always apt to be motivating reasons. In this
38. Examples of Objectivist theories can be found in ibid.; Quinn, “Putting Rational-
ity in Its Place”; John Broome, “Reasons,” inReason and Value, ed. R. JayWallace et al. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), 77–86, and Rationality through Reasoning, chap. 4; Brunero,
“Reasons as Explanations”; Kearns and Star, “Reasons as Evidence”; Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Normativity (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2008), chap. 9.
39. The concept of explanation in use here is metaphysical, not epistemic: the rele-
vant explanans are something like truth-makers. Note that on these views not all elements
of the relevant explanations count as normative reasons to f; see Broome, Rationality through
Reasoning, 53–55. I ignore that complication here. Broome appeals to facts about what you
ought to do, not facts about what would be good.
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way, Objectivists would mirror the way that Subjectivists explain Dispo-
sitional Internalism by positing that both normative reasons and moti-
vating reasons can be analyzed in terms of pro-attitudes.
I think the natural way to extend Objectivism to produce a theory of
rationalization is to appeal to an important feature that distinguishes
normative reasons from motivating reasons. It is assumed by virtually all
participants in this debate that p is a normative reason for someone to
f only if p is true.40 By contrast, there is no such factivity constraint on
motivating reasons: false beliefs can be motivating reasons. It is thus nat-
ural for the Objectivist to say that a set of mental states rationalizes an
action when, if propositions appropriately related to them were true,
those propositions would explain why the action would be good. Your
(perhaps false) belief that it is raining and your belief that it is valuable
to stay dry rationalize your taking the umbrella because, if those beliefs
were true, facts corresponding to the propositions appropriately related
to those beliefs would explain why it would be valuable for you to take an
umbrella.
Say that a set of propositions nonfactively explains p if and only if,
were the propositions all true, p would be true, and facts correspond-
ing to those propositions would explain p.41 Then we can more precisely
state the theory of rationalization just described:
Objectivism about Rationalization. A set of possible mental
states, S, rationalizes an action, f, for an agent, A, if and only if the
members of S are appropriately related to the members of a set of
propositions, P, which nonfactively explain the proposition that it
would be good if A f-ed.
Objectivism about Rationalization is the claim that mental states ratio-
nalize actions by (nonfactively) explaining why the actions would be
good. This is what itmeans formental states to “make sense” of actions, or
to “render them intelligible.” Recall that, as we are using the term here,
rationalization is a relation that obtains between possible mental states
and action types, and a set of possible mental states may stand in the
rationalization relation to your f-ing even if they are not mental states
you currently have.
This proposal offers a unified account of normative reasons and mo-
tivating reasons in terms of a single idea, namely, explanations of evaluative
40. This is rarely argued for explicitly. For discussion, see Williams, “Internal and
External Reasons,” 102–3.
41. Presumably more would need to be said about this idea of nonfactive explanation.
For development of a similar idea, see Mark Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence, Strin-
gency, and Subjective Reasons,” Philosophical Studies 143 (2008): 223–48, 230ff. Compare
also Parfit on “apparent reasons” in On What Matters, vol. 1, chap. 1.
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and normative facts or propositions. It thus offers us the kind of unified
explanation of Rational Internalism that I have claimed is desirable. Nor-
mative reasons are apt to be motivating reasons because whenever a set of
propositions counts in favor of A’s f-ing, the mental states appropriately
related to those propositions will rationalize the agent’s f-ing and are thus
candidate motivating reasons.
B. The Problem of Instrumental Motivation
Although Objectivism about Rationalization seems prima facie attrac-
tive, and I suspect some Objectivists have tacitly accepted it,42 it faces a
serious problem, which I call the problem of instrumental motivation.
Objectivism about Rationalization appears to be inconsistent with the
possibility of an important class of actions. I consider two strategies Ob-
jectivists might use to solve this problem. The first strategy is straight-
forward and exploits one of the paradigm cases of the appropriate re-
lation that I described above. The second strategy posits a new case of
the appropriate relation and attempts to exploit it to solve the problem.
The first strategy, I argue, requires accepting a very strong version of the
so-called guise of the good thesis and will be unappealing to many Ob-
jectivists for that reason. The second strategy involves adopting what is
sometimes called perceptualism about desire. Although perceptualism
is controversial, this will be the more attractive strategy for many. I argue,
however, that even if we grant the truth of perceptualism it is far from
clear that the strategy can be made to work. The upshot is that there is
no straightforward and attractive way for Objectivism to explain Rational
Internalism.
Now turn to the problem. This problem concerns cases in which an
agent performs an action simply because it is a means to one of her goals
and not also because of any explicit reflection on normative or evaluative
matters. Consider an agent who looks at her watch because she wants to
know what time it is or who starts her car because it is a (partial) means
to her goal of going to the hardware store. It is standardly thought that
the psychological story about such cases is simple: when someone acts
instrumentally, her motivating reason consists of a pro-attitude specify-
ing her goal (a desire or intention) and a means-ends belief specifying
the relevance of this particular action to the goal. On this view, the pro-
42. Here I have in mind Joseph Raz, although he does not accept the causal theory of
action and thus does not need precisely the conception of rationalization appealed to here.
See, e.g., Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good,” and “On the Guise of the Good,” in Desire,
Practical Reason, and the Good, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 111–37. At other times it is less clear whether Raz is committed to something like
this idea. See, e.g., Raz, “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative.”
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attitude and the means-ends belief rationalize the action and explain
it.43
Objectivism about Rationalization appears to be in tension with the
standard view of instrumental motivation. It is not obviously true that
any pair of a desire and a means-ends belief is appropriately related to
propositions that (nonfactively) explain why the agent’s acting in the
relevantwaywould be good. Paradigmatically, an agent’s desire andmeans-
end belief are appropriately related to the proposition that the agent has
the desire and to the proposition that is the content of the means-ends
belief. But these two propositions do not explain (even nonfactively) why
the agent’s actionwouldbegood, unless one accepts a general background
principle to the effect that taking the means to your desired ends is always
good. Rejecting that principle, however, is a central motivation for many
Objectivists. Objectivists hold that sometimes performing an action that
promotes one of your goals is worthless or even wicked.44 That such pairs
of mental states can rationalize action thus appears to be inconsistent with
Objectivism about Rationalization.
Can Objectivism about Rationalization be rendered consistent with
cases of instrumental motivation? To solve this problem, Objectivists must
find a way to ensure that an agent’s motivating reason is appropriately
related topropositions that (nonfactively) explain why the actionwould be
good, even in cases of purported instrumental motivation. I will consider
two strategies for doing that, both of which require taking on substantial
commitments in moral psychology and the theory of rational agency.
The first strategy exploits the appropriate relation that holds be-
tween a belief and the proposition that is its content. Objectivists can
adopt the thesis often called the “guise of the good,” according to which
part of the causal explanation of every action is the agent’s belief that
performing the action would be good. On this view, either all so-called
pro-attitudes consist in such evaluative beliefs or the standard psycholog-
ical story about instrumental motivation is incomplete, as instrumentally
motivated actions are caused by a pro-attitude, a means-end belief, and an
evaluative belief. In either case, the evaluative beliefs that are part of the
cause of every action are appropriately related to evaluative or normative
propositions that nonfactively explain the goodness of the action, as Ob-
jectivism about Rationalization requires. Pursuing this strategy is appeal-
ing in part because several Objectivists have defended the guise of the
good thesis on independent grounds.45
43. This story can be found in, e.g., Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.”
44. Think of Caligula and of Quinn’s example of the man who desires to turn on
radios in “Putting Rationality in Its Place.”
45. The idea that intentions just are normative or evaluative beliefs is suggested by
Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons”; and defended by
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The version of the guise of the good thesis that this strategy requires
is very strong in two different ways. First, it holds that the normative or
evaluative belief associated with each action is part of the cause of the
action. By contrast, many other versions of the guise of the good thesis
posit a weaker kind of connection between action and evaluative belief.
Some hold, for example, that the agent believes the action is good (but
that belief might not be part of the cause of the action) or that the agent
has a disposition or tendency to judge that her action is good.46 Even
weaker versions hold that any agent is under a requirement of rationality
to make such a judgment, on reflection.47 Because the goal of this strat-
egy is to make good on the claim that all motivating reasons are appro-
priately related to facts that explain the goodness of an action, it must
posit that the evaluative belief is part of the agent’s motivating reason.
The second way in which the requisite version of the guise of the
good thesis is strong concerns the content of the evaluative beliefs it as-
sociates with all actions. The content of these evaluative beliefs (along with
the contents of the other beliefs and the fact that the agent has relevant
pro-attitudes) must be sufficient to nonfactively explain why the action
would be good, in exactly the sense appealed to byObjectivism about Nor-
mative Reasons.48 It thus must be a normative or evaluative content of a
very strong kind. By contrast, many versions of the guise of the good the-
sis posit that these evaluative beliefs have a less robust evaluative content.
One weaker version, for example, requires only that the evaluative or nor-
mative judgment bring the action under some kind of “desirability char-
acterization,” which might be merely that it would be pleasurable or it
would be conducive to the agent’s ends.49
49. Note that these evaluations do not entail that the action would be good full stop.
This point is emphasized by Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008), chap. 2.
46. Scanlon suggests the latter idea in What We Owe to Each Other, 39.
47. This idea is in the spirit of Broome’s “enkrasia” requirement in Rationality through
Reasoning, chap. 9.
48. An appeal to such strong desirability characterizations has recently been defended
in Chislenko, “A Solution for Buridan’s Ass”; as well as (possibly) in Raz, “Agency, Reason,
and the Good,” and “On the Guise of the Good”; Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence,
Stringency, and Subjective Reasons.” Two Objectivists who appear to accept a weaker
desirability characterization are Buss, “What Practical Reasoning Must Be”; and Quinn,
“Putting Rationality in Its Place.”
Eugene Chislenko, “A Solution for Buridan’s Ass,” Ethics 126 (2016): 283–310. The idea
that all actions are in part caused by a normative or evaluative belief is defended in an
Objectivist context in Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the Good,” and “On the Guise of the
Good”; Sarah Buss, “What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 399–421; Quinn, “Putting Rationality in Its
Place.” A useful recent survey of the literature on the guise of the good is Francesco Orsi,
“The Guise of the Good,” Philosophy Compass 10 (2015): 714–24.
Asarnow Rational Internalism 167
This content downloaded from 141.140.072.200 on September 21, 2016 12:10:05 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
That this strategy requires such a strong version of the guise of the
good thesis is a substantial problem. This version of that thesis is widely
thought to be subject to at least four classes of counterexample.50 One
is cases of cognitively unsophisticated agents, such as small children,
who act intentionally and for reasons but who may lack the relevant nor-
mative or evaluative concepts. A second class concerns evaluatively neu-
tral or indifferent actions, in which an agent performs an intentional
action of such low stakes (such as jiggling one’s leg or idly taking a sip of
water) that it seems implausible she genuinely has an evaluative or nor-
mative belief endorsing the action. A third class is so-called perverse ac-
tion, when an agent performs an action she believes is in some way bad
and in no way good. A famous example is Augustine, who claims to have
stolen his neighbor’s pears while seeking “no profit from wickedness but
only to be wicked.”51 A final category is cases of evaluative or normative
uncertainty. Suppose that an agent must choose between several options
that she judges to have identical expected values, where one option will
lead to a substantial gain and the others to a substantial loss. In such
cases, it is often thought that an agent may act intentionally without judg-
ing that her action will be valuable in the relevant sense (as she is affirma-
tively uncertain).52
Some philosophers deny that these types of cases pose a problem
for this very strong guise of the good thesis.53 I suspect, however, that
even many Objectivists who accept some version of the guise of the good
thesis will not wish to accept the extremely strong version this strategy
requires. The straightforward strategy for solving the problem of instru-
mental motivation will not be appealing for those Objectivists.
Now turn to the second strategy for solving the problem. Recall that
I earlier provided two clear examples of the appropriate relation, one of
which was appealed to by the guise of the good strategy. For all I have
said, however, there may be other cases of the appropriate relation, that
is, other pairs of mental states and propositions such that being in the
mental state is (in the relevant sense) a way of recognizing or responding
to the proposition. The second strategy I consider involves positing and
then exploiting another instance of the appropriate relation.
50. For discussion, see, e.g., J. David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” in The
Possibility of Practical Reason, 99–122; Michael Stocker, “Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral
Psychology,” Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 738–53; David Sussman, “For Badness’ Sake,”
Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 613–28.
51. Quoted in Sussman, “For Badness’ Sake,” 614.
52. This example may not have force against versions of Objectivism that appeal to
expected or prospective goodness rather than actual goodness. For discussion of this point,
see Broome, Rationality through Reasoning, chap. 3.
53. See, e.g., Chislenko, “A Solution for Buridan’s Ass”; Raz, “Agency, Reason, and the
Good”; Schroeder, “Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons.”
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According to the version of this strategy I will consider, any pro-
attitude that can feature in an agent’s motivating reason (such as an in-
tention or a desire) is per se appropriately related to an evaluative prop-
osition of the kind adequate to satisfy Objectivism about Rationalization.
This instance of the appropriate relation holds directly, without the me-
diation of evaluative or normative beliefs. This strategy ensures that any set
of rationalizing attitudes is appropriately related to propositions that non-
factively explain why the relevant action would be good.
This strategy may appeal to philosophers who accept perceptual-
ism about desire.54 On this kind of view, desiring that p obtain involves
being in a perceptual state with a normative or evaluative content. For ex-
ample, desiring that p obtain may involve perceiving that p’s obtaining
would be good. This perceptual state is not factive, and onemay desire that
p obtain (and thus perceive that p’s obtaining would be good) while failing
to believe that the content of the perception is true or while believing that
the content of the perception is false.
While perceptualism is highly controversial, it is designed to avoid
the counterexamples that arose for the first strategy, and so this strat-
egy may seemmore promising. In cases of perverse action and normative
or evaluative uncertainty, for example, this strategy proposes that the
means-ends beliefs and the desires or intentions of the agent are ap-
propriately related to propositions that together nonfactively explain
why the relevant action is good because the desires or intentions them-
selves are appropriately related to the (false) proposition that the action
is good. This strategy does not require that the agents in such cases be-
lieve that their actions are good, nor does it require that it be true that
the action itself is good.
Does adopting this perceptualist idea allow us to solve the problem
of instrumental motivation? I think it is plausible that certain kinds of
pro-attitudes are per se appropriately related to certain evaluative prop-
ositions; for example, if there is a distinctive kind of moral resentment,
then the attitude of moral resentment may be appropriately related to
propositions about morality or blameworthiness. However, I think it is
far from clear whether all pro-attitudes are appropriately related to such
propositions, as needed in order to exploit this idea to solve the problem
54. See, e.g., Graham Oddie, Value, Reality, and Desire (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), chap. 3; Sergio Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Dennis Stampe, “The Authority of Desire,” Philosophical Review
96 (1987): 335–81; Karl Schafer, “Perception and the Rational Force of Desire,” Journal of
Philosophy 110 (2013): 258–81. Related ideas are defended in Scanlon,What We Owe to Each
Other, chap. 1. The name perceptualism is used by Derek Baker, “The Abductive Case for
Humeanism over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philoso-
phy 8 (2014): 1–29. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Ethics for helping me see the
relevance of perceptualism in this context.
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of instrumental motivation. In particular, I suspect that this exploitation
of perceptualism is subject to a class of counterexamples: it threatens to
generate the verdict that the fact that an action was good was an agent’s
reason for acting even in cases when that is manifestly implausible.
Recall from Section II.B the two necessary conditions I propose for
when a fact counts as an agent’s motivating reason. One condition
(adapted from Smith) is that the fact is part of the explanation of why
the agent has one of the mental states that is her motivating reason
strictly construed. The other condition is that the fact and the mental
state be appropriately related. I suggested above that I suspect these con-
ditions are jointly sufficient, although I cannot defend that idea here. I
will argue, however, that if these conditions are jointly sufficient, then this
strategy is subject to counterexample, and I argue below that it is not clear
what additional principles could be added in order to avoid the counter-
examples.
The counterexamples I have in mind are special cases of perverse
action and normative uncertainty. In cases of perverse action and nor-
mative uncertainty, it can happen that (unbeknownst to the agent) the
action the agent performs turns out to be good. For example, suppose
that (to his eventual chagrin) stealing the pears would genuinely be a
good thing for Augustine to do. Or suppose that the agent faced with
normative uncertainty happens to choose the option that will lead to the
substantial gain and will thus be genuinely good. In these cases, it is true
that the action performed is good, and according to this strategy, that
evaluative fact is appropriately related to the pro-attitudes that were part
of these agents’ motivating reasons.
Now notice that, in such cases, it may also be that the agent’s desire
is in fact (again, unbeknownst to the agent) explained by the fact that
the action would be good.55 In such a case, both necessary conditions
mentioned above are met: the agent’s desire to act is in part explained
by the evaluative fact, and it is appropriately related to that fact. If those
two conditions are sufficient for the fact counting as the agent’s reason
for action, then the fact that the action would be good counts as the
agent’s reason for action. I think that is manifestly implausible. In these
cases, the agent’s belief that ~p or affirmative uncertainty concerning p
is either part of the agent’s motivating reason or occurrent in the agent’s
psychology around the time of acting. It seems highly plausible to me
that either of those conditions is sufficient to discount the fact that p
from counting as one’s reason for action. If your belief that ~p is part of
your motivating reason (strictly speaking), then it is not the case that the
55. Those who doubt the explanatory power of evaluative facts may instead appeal to
the natural facts that constitute the goodness of the action or that are its supervenience
base.
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fact that p counts as your reason for acting. We can surely be mistaken
about our reasons for action—for example, by being mistaken about
which of our beliefs and desires in fact caused us to act—but I do not
think it is plausible that we can be mistaken in this way.56 I thus conclude
that, if the two necessary conditions I proposed earlier are jointly suffi-
cient, then this strategy is subject to counterexample.57
Proponents of this strategy could respond to these counterexamples
by proposing additional necessary conditions. But it is very hard for me
to see what that necessary condition might be. Proponents of this strategy
might suggest that the necessary condition is simply that the agent not
occurrently disbelieve or be affirmatively uncertain concerning the propo-
sition in question, since those are the features of the cases that I claimed
caused problems. I do not think this necessary condition solves the prob-
lem, however. It seems tome that a wider range of attitudes toward a prop-
osition such as ~p can (at least sometimes) prevent the fact that p from
counting as an agent’s reason for acting, and this necessary condition will
not rule them all out. Consider a case in which Augustine has become so
accustomed to acting perversely that he does it out of habit, without re-
flecting each and every time on the badness of his action. In stealing the
pears today, he does not have an occurrent belief that this particular act
of stealing would be bad, although he is disposed to form such a belief on
reflection. In such a case hemeets the additional necessary conditionmen-
tioned above, but I think it remains implausible that the fact that Augus-
tine’s action would be good counts as his reason for action. This is not a
conclusive argument against the possibility of proposing additional nec-
essary conditions that might rule out these counterexamples, but it sug-
gests to me that developing this perceptualist strategy for Objectivists will
not be straightforward.
C. Prospects for Objectivism
I have argued that cases of instrumental motivation pose a serious prob-
lem for Objectivism about Rationalization. One strategy for solving the
problem will be uncongenial to many. This strategy appeals to a very strong
version of the guise of the good thesis to which many philosophers believe
there are counterexamples. A second strategy for solving the problem also
generates counterexamples if we accept what I suggested are plausibly
sufficient conditions for a fact counting as an agent’s reason for action. I
56. This claim is weaker than the claim, defended in Setiya, “Reasons and Causes,”
that for p to be an agent’s reason for action, it must be the case that she believes that p. I
reject that claim. For related reflections, see J. David Velleman, “Introduction,” in The
Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–31.
57. Note that perceptualism about desire does not entail that desires are per se ap-
propriately related to evaluative facts. This argument is thus not an argument against per-
ceptualism.
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further argued that it is far from obvious what additional necessary con-
ditions might be added in order to block those counterexamples.
How should Objectivists respond to these problems? I see three op-
tions. The first is simply to accept the exceptionally strong version of the
guise of the good thesis, as Raz sometimes appears to have done.58 Phi-
losophers antecedently motivated by the overall picture of the nature of
action and of rational agency associated with this version of the guise of
the good thesis will be happy to follow Raz here.59 But many Objectivists
have not thought of themselves as committed to that picture of rational
agency, and I think they will find adopting it an unattractive option.
A second option is to reject Rational Internalism, thereby conced-
ing that there is no deep relationship between the reasons that explain
our actions and the reasons that justify them.60 For reasons given in Sec-
tion II.C above, I think this option is also unattractive.
The third option is to accept a disjunctive theory of rationaliza-
tion. Objectivists can weaken Objectivism about Rationalization so that
it states only a sufficient condition for rationalization. This could be com-
bined with some other sufficient condition that explains cases of instru-
mental motivation. On such a theory, an agent’s mental states rationalize
an action when propositions appropriately related to them would, if true,
explain why the action would be good or when some other criterion is
met—for example, when they would explain how the action furthers one
of the agent’s goals.
This kind of disjunctive theory is consistent, but I think it should
be our last resort. It does not offer the kind of unified explanation that
is desirable. Such a theory will not explain what normative reasons and
motivating reasons have in common, such that normative reasons are
apt to be motivating reasons. The Internalism Requirement is supposed
to state a deep connection between these two ideas; if we validate it by ap-
peal to a gerrymandered or disjunctive theory of rationalization, our the-
ory is less plausible as a result.
One way in which this problem detracts from Objectivism’s plausi-
bility is that it means Objectivism still offers us less than Subjectivism does.
Subjectivism offers us an interpretation of the Internalism Requirement,
as well as a unified theory of normative reasons and motivating reasons.
By contrast, Objectivism would only offer us one of those things. But I will
now argue that it is a problem for a second reason: there is a competing
58. Raz takes the first route in “Agency, Reason, and the Good,” and “On the Guise of
the Good.”
59. On this picture of rational agency, see, e.g., Matthew Boyle and Douglas Lavin,
“Goodness and Desire,” in Tenenbaum, Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, 161–201; Buss,
“What Practical Reasoning Must Be.”
60. This strategy is suggested by a remark of Broome’s, at Broome, Rationality through
Reasoning, 47.
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theory of reasons which can offer us everything that traditionally moti-
vatesObjectivists as well as a unified explanation ofmotivating reasons and
normative reasons whichwill explainwhyRational Internalism is true. This
theory is the Reasoning View.
IV. THE REASONING VIEW
Versions of the Reasoning View were suggested early on in the reasons
debate by Bernard Williams, Gilbert Harman, Paul Grice, and Joseph Raz,
and it has recently been defended by Kieran Setiya and Jonathan Way.61
One way to get acquainted with the view is to look closely at Williams’s
original version of Subjectivism, which also counts as a version of the Rea-
soning View:
Williams’s Subjectivism. There is a normative reason for A to f
if and only if there is a sound deliberative route from A’s subjec-
tive motivational set to A’s f-ing.62
This idea is a version of Subjectivism, as it analyzes normative reasons in
terms of the pro-attitudes that make up an agent’s “subjective motiva-
tional set.” But his analysis also crucially appeals to the idea of a “sound
deliberative route” and thus to the norms of good practical reasoning.
This is the idea at the heart of the Reasoning View.63
Recent versions of the Reasoning View provide an account of which
facts, in particular, are the normative reasons for an agent to act. The
normative reasons for an agent to f are the premises of the relevant
“sound deliberative routes.” A normative reason is a possible premise in
a sound piece of practical reasoning. Or, since those premises (strictly
speaking) are mental states with contents, the normative reasons are the
facts appropriately related to those mental states.64
61. See Grice, Aspects of Reason, pt. 1; Harman, Change in View, app. C; Raz, Practical
Reason and Norms, and “Introduction”; Way, “Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning”;
Setiya, Reasons without Rationalism, and “What Is a Reason to Act?”; Silverstein, “Reducing
Reasons.”
62. Adapted from Williams, “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons,”
91. As noted above, Williams officially endorsed only a version of Dispositional Internalism.
63. What exactly constitutes the norms of good practical reasoning is a difficult ques-
tion which I cannot answer here. I agree with Gilbert Harman, however, that the norms of
good reasoning are not to be identified with the inference rules of any deductive system.
See Harman, Change in View, and Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), pt. 1.
64. In saying that the mental states are the premises of the reasoning, I do not mean
that agents self-consciously reflect on their mental states in reasoning. Rather, I mean that
the role a content plays in one’s reasoning depends not only on that content but on the
attitude one takes toward it (say, believing it or desiring that it obtain). On this point, see
Broome, Rationality through Reasoning, chap. 14.
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The Reasoning View is consistent with Subjectivism but does not
require it. Williams’s version is Subjectivist: he holds that there is a nor-
mative reason for you to f if and only if a good piece of reasoning can
be constructed out of a set of possible premise states that includes your
motivations—which he takes to include your normative, evaluative, and
moral commitments—and possible beliefs about relevant descriptive
facts. On this view, normative and evaluative facts which you do not be-
lieve or accept (if such there be) will not generate reasons for you. But
the Reasoning View need not be Subjectivist in this way. Just as Williams
allows possible beliefs in descriptive facts into the premise sets (even
when the agent does not have them), we can also allow possible beliefs in
normative and evaluative facts into the premise set (even when the agent
does not have them).65
In formulating the Reasoning View, I appeal to the idea of the
norms of practical reasoning endorsing a certain transition of thought.
Intuitively, the norms of reasoning endorse a transition of thought when
that transition of thought conforms to a correct rule of reasoning.66 For
example, plausibly the norms of theoretical reasoning endorse transi-
tions of thought that conform to modus ponens (such as the inference to a
belief that q from a belief that p and a belief that p implies q) and various
forms of induction and abduction. The norms of practical reasoning plau-
sibly endorse transitions that conform to rules of instrumental reasoning
and what Broome has called enkratic reasoning.67
We can now state the Reasoning View more precisely. Call this the
Reasoning View about Normative Reasons:
RV Normative Reasons. A normative reason for A to f is a set
of facts, F, such that the norms of practical reasoning endorse the
transition from a set of possible mental states, M, the elements of
which are appropriately related to the elements of F, to A’s intention
to f.
Williams’s Subjectivism is a version of this view which constrains the “set
of possible mental states” so that they must be either mental states of the
agent or possible beliefs in descriptive truths. According to the version I
prefer, any desires or intentions in that set must be desires or intentions
65. Such versions of the Reasoning View give up the ambition of reducing all nor-
mative and evaluative facts to facts about normative reasons.
66. Note that following a correct rule of reasoning is necessary but perhaps not suf-
ficient for reasoning well. There may be other necessary conditions on a token instance of
reasoning counting as good reasoning. Compare Broome’s discussion of “basing permis-
sions of rationality” and the distinction he draws between following a correct rule and
correctly following a correct rule (Rationality through Reasoning, 242ff.).
67. See ibid., chap. 14, 16.
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the agent actually has, but the set may include beliefs in evaluative or
normative truths that the agent does not have.
RV Normative Reasons pairs naturally with what is sometimes called
the “standard story” in the philosophy of action to offer what I earlier
called a unified explanation of Rational Internalism.68 The standard way
to give an account of the rationalization relation is by appeal to the
norms of practical reasoning. This is how Davidson, for example, pro-
posed that we think about the idea of rationalization.69 On this view, a set
of mental states rationalizes an action when those mental states could be
the premises of a (at least minimally) good piece of practical reasoning.
Call this idea the Reasoning View about Rationalization:
RV Rationalization. A set of mental states, S, rationalizes an ac-
tion, f, for agent A, if and only if the norms of practical reasoning at
least minimally endorse the transition from S to A’s intention to f.
Mental states rationalize an action when they are the premises of a good
piece of reasoning that could bring you to decide to perform that action.
Call the conjunction of RV Rationalization and RV Normative Rea-
sons the Reasoning View simpliciter. The Reasoning View entails Ratio-
nal Internalism. Whenever p is a normative reason for you to f, p is ap-
propriately related to a possible mental state that is part of a sound piece
of reasoning that could bring you to intend to f. So the belief that p (at
least in part) rationalizes yourf-ing, as Rational Internalismdemands. The
Reasoning View also explains why Rational Internalism is true. According
to the Reasoning View, all facts about reasons are facts about reasoning.
Normative reasons and motivating reasons are both to be understood in
terms of the norms of good reasoning. That is why normative reasons are
apt to be motivating reasons; both kinds of reasons earn their status as
such by reference to the same thing, the norms of good reasoning.
Three points about theReasoningViewdeserve emphasis. First, RVRa-
tionalization is widely thought to be more plausible than the very strong
version of the guise of the good thesis. Critics of RV Rationalization have
argued that it cannot explain some cases of irrational or arational actions.70
On this view, not all actions are even minimally rational: some actions are
wholly irrational or arational. Agents who commit wholly irrational or ara-
tional actions, it is thought, do not act on the basis of mental states that
form the premises of a minimally good piece of reasoning. Because such
68. On the “standard story,” see, e.g., Smith, “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action”;
J. David Velleman, “What HappensWhen Someone Acts?” in The Possibility of Practical Reason,
123–43; Constantine Sandis, “Introduction,” in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, 1–9.
69. Davidson, “Intending.” Related remarks can be found in Donald Davidson, “How
Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Essays on Actions and Events, 21–42, 31.
70. See, e.g., Hursthouse, “Arational Actions.”
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agents nonetheless act for reasons, they are thought to be counterexam-
ples to a theory of motivating reasons that includes RV Rationalization.
Proponents of RV Rationalization have generally responded by emphasiz-
ing that minimal rationality is not full rationality. An agent can act on the
basis of states that constitute the premises of a minimally good piece of
reasoning, even if his or her overall psychology is such that the rational
thing for him or her to do is something else. In weakness of the will, for
example, an agent plausibly acts on the basis of the premises of a piece of
instrumental reasoning, even though the action is irrational given the rest
of her psychology.71 The idea that all action involves minimal, local ratio-
nal success on the part of the agent (perhaps an agent who is otherwise
highly irrational) is certainly not uncontroversial, but I think it can be ac-
cepted by many philosophers who reject the very strong guise of the good
thesis appealed to by Objectivism about Rationalization.
Second, the Reasoning View is compatible with the existence of ob-
jective values in the sense described above (although it does not entail
it). For proponents of the Reasoning View, the question of whether there
are genuinely objective values is open: it depends on whether there is
genuinely good practical reasoning that has as its premises only evalu-
ative and normative judgments (and not pro-attitudes in addition). If it
is ever good reasoning to form an intention on the basis of a true moral
judgment without a desire as well, then morality will give normative rea-
sons even to agents who do not share those true moral judgments—since,
if they did share them, those moral judgments would rationalize their
actions. (Recall that, according to RV Normative Reasons, there can be a
normative reason for you to do something even though you are not mo-
tivated to act in that way at all.)
Finally, the Reasoning View does not entail the objectionable idea
that there are normative reasons for Caligula to do evil or imprudent
things. Proponents of the Reasoning View can choose between two differ-
ent strategies for obtaining this result. One of these is a strategy familiar
from Kantian theories of normative reasons and from Setiya’s broadly
Aristotelian version of the Reasoning View.72 This strategy builds require-
ments of morality and prudence into the norms of good reasoning. Ac-
cording to Kantians and Aristotelians, it is simply bad reasoning to form
an intention to torture someone (for example) on the basis of a desire to
do so. The norms of practical reasoning are such that the immoral con-
71. On this strategy, see Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?”; Smith,
“The Possibility of Philosophy of Action.”
72. See, e.g., Korsgaard, “Skepticismabout Practical Reason”; Smith, “InternalReasons”;
Setiya, Reasons without Rationalism. The Reasoning View here requires a weaker commitment
than do the theories of Korsgaard and Smith. The Reasoning View allows that fully rational
agents might have immoral desires; it holds that they would not act on them.
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tents of those desires and intentions render them inappropriate as prem-
ises of such reasoning. When Caligula forms an intention to torture some-
one on the basis of his desire to do so, he does not follow a correct rule
of reasoning.
An alternate strategy for dealing with this objection requires a mod-
ification to RVNormative Reasons.Many philosophers hold that the norms
of good practical and theoretical reasoning are defeasible or nonmono-
tonic. That is, the norms may endorse coming to a particular conclusion
on the basis of a set of premise states despite not endorsing coming to that
conclusion on the basis of certain strictly larger sets of premise states. Con-
sider an enumerative induction that supports believing a universal gener-
alization: from many white swan observations, you infer that all swans are
white. Plausibly, the norms of good theoretical reasoning endorse that
piece of inductive reasoning. They do not, however, endorse coming to
that same conclusion on the basis of a premise set that includes all of
those premises and some further premise (such as the belief that there
exists a black swan). Following John Pollock, this phenomenon is often
called “defeat” or “undercutting defeat”: the belief that there is a black
swan defeats or undercuts that inference.73 In light of possible practical
analogues of this phenomenon, somephilosophersmay wish tomodify RV
Normative Reasons so as to exclude pieces of reasoning for which there
exists a fact that would serve as such a defeater. On this view, only possible
pieces of sound reasoning for which there are no defeaters generate
normative reasons.74 Proponents of this version of the Reasoning View can
respond to the worry that the Reasoning View overgenerates normative
reasons by appealing to the idea that certain kinds of normative facts (such
as facts about moral prohibitions) function as defeaters. On this view, it is
(defeasibly) good reasoning to form an intention to torture on the basis
of a desire to torture, but such a piece of reasoning is undercut or defeated
by the fact that torture is morally forbidden and so does not generate a
normative reason to torture.
73. Note that Pollock uses “undercutting” to refer to a special case of what I here call
defeat. See John L. Pollock, “Defeasible Reasoning,” Cognitive Science 11 (1987): 481–518;
John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1999). See also Harman, Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind; Keith
Frankish, “Non-monotonic Inference,” in The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, ed.
Keith Brown (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006), 672–75.
74. I develop the Reasoning View along these lines, and respond to objections, in
Samuel Asarnow, “The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning” (unpublished
manuscript, Macalester College). One constraint on such versions of the Reasoning View is
that they offer an analysis of undercutting defeat in terms of some notion other than that of
a normative reason. For an independent argument in favor of that idea, see Nicholas
Shackel, “Still Waiting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons,” Philosophical Studies 167
(2014): 607–33.
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V. CONCLUSION
Rational Internalism is a principle relating what it is for a normative rea-
son to count in favor of an action with what it is for a motivating reason to
count in favor of an action. Rational Internalism provides a plausible in-
terpretation of the schematic Internalism Requirement while being con-
sistent with the possibility of objective values, unlike the familiar thesis of
Dispositional Internalism. I have argued that it should be appealing to a
broadrangeofphilosophers. Ihavealsoargued that itwouldbedesirable to
have a theory of rationalization that pairs with our theory of normative rea-
sons to provide a unified explanation of why Rational Internalism is true.
This claim led to an argument against Objectivist theories of nor-
mative reasons. I argued that cases of instrumental motivation show that
it is not obvious how traditional Objectivist theories of normative reasons
can be extended to provide such a theory of rationalization. Offering such
a theory would require Objectivists to take on substantial commitments in
moral psychology and the theory of rational agency.Onepossible such com-
mitment is a very strong version of the guise of the good thesis, which is
widely thought to be implausible. Another possibility is a version of per-
ceptualism about desire, which is more plausible, but which it is not obvi-
ous can be used to solve the problem.
This argument, I claimed, lends substantial support to a different the-
ory of normative reasons, the Reasoning View. The Reasoning View can
straightforwardly offer a unified explanation of Rational Internalism. And
since the Reasoning View is compatible with the existence of objective val-
ues (a centralmotivation forObjectivism), I argue that the Reasoning View
shouldbe taken seriously by philosophers otherwise attracted toObjectivism.
178 Ethics October 2016
This content downloaded from 141.140.072.200 on September 21, 2016 12:10:05 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
